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NOTES
Criminal Procedure: Atwater v. City of Lago Vista: The
Due Process Dilemma of Fourth Amendment Seizures for
Traffic Violations*
L Introduction
Imagine that you are driving home from a long day at work on a
Thursday evening. Driving a few miles over the speed limit (we all do it)
so that you will not be late to a dinner date and forgetting to buckle your
seatbelt, you do not see the police car on the side of the road until it is too
late. He has already clocked your speed, turned on the flashing lights, and
has begun to pull onto the road behind you. Like a good citizen, you slow
down and immediately pull onto the side of the road. You get your vehicle
registration and insurance card out of the glove compartment to help the
officer and, hopefully, help yourself by making the process smoother and
quicker.
The officer approaches the car, you roll down your window, and he asks
for your license, registration, and proof of insurance. You give all of these
documents to the officer with no complaint, expecting only to receive a
citation and to be promptly on your way. Instead, much to your surprise, the
officer tells you that you are under arrest. You ask if there is a problem, and
he merely states that you have broken the law and are under arrest. Then
the officer searches the passenger compartment of your car, and you are
handcuffed, searched, and locked in the back of the police car.
The officer takes you to the county jail where you are stripped of your
possessions (and dignity by this point) and held in a cell with a few shady-
looking characters. Another officer informs you that a magistrate will not
review your case until tomorrow morning, so you are told that you should
make yourself comfortable. In the meantime, the police tow your car, and
you are expected at work tomorrow morning, not to mention your
obligations tonight. Think that this is an implausible scenario? Well, it isn't.
In the recent case of Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,' the U.S. Supreme Court
* Special thanks to Professor Robert E.L. Richardson for his invaluable contributions
to this note.
1. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
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held that an arrest for a minor traffic violation does not violate the Fourth
Amendment
Although Atwater was a logical extension of the gradual contraction of
Fourth Amendment protections in recent decades,3 many scholars and
ordinary citizens became concerned when the Supreme Court ruled that
police could arrest someone for a mere seatbelt violation.4 The Fourth
Amendment purportedly protects individuals from "unreasonable searches
and seizures;"' however, Atwater made it clear that law enforcement officers
may arrest individuals for misdemeanors. Making an arrest for an offense
for which the maximum punishment is a small fine is arguably unreason-
able.' The "basic principle of Fourth Amendment law" is that a search and
seizure inside a home without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable.7
Moreover, the law requires that a warrant will not issue without a finding
of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate
2. Id. at 323.
3. James A. Adams, Search and Seizure as Seen by Supreme Court Justices: Are They
Serious or Is This Just Judicial Humor?, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 413, 475 (1993)
(stating that Supreme Court decisions have led to much confusion in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and ultimately less protection of individual rights); Daniel T. Gillespie, Bright-
Line Rules: Development of the Law of Search and Seizure During Traffic Stops, 31 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3 (1999) (tracing evolving tensions between state and individual interests in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Martin L. O'Connor, Vehicle Searches - The Automobile
Exception: The Constitutional Ride from Carroll v. United States to Wyoming v. Houghton,
16 TOURo L. REV. 393, 393 (2000) (stating that there has been "substantial criticism of the
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court"); Timothy P. O'Neill, Beyond
Privacy, Beyond Probable Cause, Beyond the Fourth Amendment: New Strategies for
Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U. CoLO. L. REV. 693, 700 (1998) (suggesting that a
jurisprudence based on due process rather than privacy is more suited to examine what a
police officer can do as opposed to what the officer can search); Chris K. Visser, Comment,
Without a Warrant, Probable Cause, or Reasonable Suspicion: Is There Any Meaning to the
Fourth Amendment While Driving a Car?, 35 Hous. L. REV. 1683, 1686 (1999) (stating that
"citizens are now afforded less Fourth Amendment protections while driving").
4. Barton Aronson, Why the "Soccer Mom" Should Win the Seat-Belt Case: The
Problem With Custodial Arrests for Offenses That Are Vtot Punishable with Jail Time,
Findlaw's Legal Commentary (Dec. 15, 2000), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/aronson/
20001215.html; Michael C. Dorf, Washington Yankees in King Arthur's Court: The Supreme
Court Journeys to Eighteenth Century England to Define the Rights of Twenty-first Century
Americans, Findlaw's Legal Commentary (May 2,2001), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/
20010502.html.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
6. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 n. 14 (1984) (stating that the penalty provided
for an offense provides an adequate gauge of the state's interest in arrest for that offense).
7. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
8. United States v. Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 552 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
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Over the years, however, many exceptions to this rule evolved, allowing
warrantless searches and seizures outside the sacrosanct confines of the
home.9 The common thread is that the United States Supreme Court has
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement when exigent circumstan-
ces exist, such as safety concerns or potential loss of evidence."' As
discussed below, one of the most recognized exceptions pertains to
automobiles.
When the Supreme Court recognized the automobile exception," it held
that individuals have a lesser expectation of privacy associated with vehicles
than with their homes. Because the Supreme Court did not want to further
confuse law enforcement officers with the many exceptions allowing
warrantless searches and seizures, the Atwater Court declined to develop
another test specifically for minor offenses, like traffic violations.'2
Therefore, this note will argue that states must use legislative means to limit
arrests for minor offenses.
Part II of this note explores judicial decisions affecting search and seizure
rights under the Fourth Amendment and traces the contraction of these rights
in automobile cases leading up to Atwater. Part III discusses the particular
facts, the central issue and holding, and the reasoning of both the majority
and the dissent in Atwater. Part IV.A analyzes Atwater and discusses the
dissent's argument for a reasonableness test supported by "specific and
articulable facts,"' 3 which the majority ultimately rejected because it is not
easily administrable. Part IV.B presents three approaches to resolve the
problems of administration and to protect citizens' privacy and due process
rights. The first approach differentiates between crimes that could result in
arrest and those that ordinarily would not by employing the traditional
9. The Supreme Court has recognized the following exceptions to the warrant
requirement: (1) standard operating procedures for police operations, see Florida v. White,
526 U.S. 559 (1999); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); (2) consent by the
owner, see Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976); (3) the protective sweep, see Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990); (4) the "plain
view" doctrine, see Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730
(1983); (5) the "open field" doctrine, see Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); (6)
search incident to arrest, see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); (7) an officer in "hot
pursuit," see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); and (8) in the event of emergencies,
see Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
10. See supra note 9.
11. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
12. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468,
1475 (1985) ("By its continued adherence to the warrant requirement in theory, though not
in fact, the Court has sown massive confusion among the police and lower courts.").
13. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
2002]
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classifications of mala in se and mala prohibita.' The second option relies
on state and municipal legislative bodies to distinguish in their statutes and
ordinances between criminal offenses, civil offenses, and administrative
violations. The third option is less time-intensive and consists of legislatures
revising the language in select statutes to provide that police officers shall
not arrest individuals for minor offenses such as traffic violations. Part V
delves into the potential negative implications that the Supreme Court's
holding in Atwater could have unless states take legislative action. Part V
also explores the current status of Oklahoma law relating to arrests for
minor traffic violations.
1. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Leading to Atwater: The Contraction of
Fourth Amendment Protections
A. Establishing the Automobile Exception
The United States Supreme Court's decisions involving automobiles have
progressively contracted Fourth Amendment due process rights as applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Due process is defined as
"[t]he conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and
principles for the protection and enforcement of private rights."'5 Further-
more, such decisions have also decreased expectations of privacy associated
with automobiles. To determine privacy expectations, the Court usually
analyzes those expectations that it deems reasonable and that society in
general wants to protect." In balancing the interests of law enforcement
against the individual's right to protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures, the Court has increasingly sided with the interests of law enforce-
ment. An examination of several Supreme Court decisions involving auto-
mobiles illustrates this proposition.
Beginning the long road toward lessened privacy expectations and due
process rights, Carroll v. United States first established the automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment's search warrant requirement.' In
Carroll, the defendant and a passenger were traveling in their vehicle from
14. Malum in se is defined as "[a] crime or an act that is inherently immoral, such as
murder, arson, or rape." Malum prohibitum is defined as "[a]n act that is a crime merely
because it is prohibited by statute, although the act itself is not necessarily immoral." Mala
is the plural form of malum. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 971 (7th ed. 1999).
15. I. at 516.
16. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); New York
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
17. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
18. d. at 154.
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the direction of Detroit, heading towards Grand Rapids, Michigan.'"
Officers stopped the vehicle on a suspicion that the men were concealing
illegal liquor.' The officers were patrolling a section of highway that they
normally patrolled to find such violations.' After searching the car and
finding gin and whiskey behind the upholstery of the seats, the officers
arrested the defendant and the passenger.2
In finding an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement,
the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that the mobility of a vehicle, and thus,
the inability to get a search warrant in time to prevent the destruction of
evidence, mandated such an exception.23 However, the Court stated that the
Fourth Amendment still required probable cause to stop a vehicle.' The
Court defined probable cause as a reasonable belief arising out of the
circumstances in a particular situation.' The Carroll Court listed a
combination of factors that justified the search and seizure in question."
One of these factors was that bootleggers had established Detroit as an
active center for introducing illegal liquor into the country, and Detroit was
relatively close in proximity to the location of this search. 7 Another factor
was that the defendant had tried to furnish illegal liquor to the officers on
a previous occasion.' Additionally, the defendant was traveling from the
direction of Detroit in the same automobile that the officers had seen in their
previous dealings with the defendant. 9 Taking these factors into con-
sideration, the Court held that probable cause existed and that the war-
rantless search and seizure were valid." Thus, the automobile exception to
the Fourth Amendment's requirement for a search warrant was born, paving
the way for the contraction of due process rights and a lesser expectation of
privacy associated with automobiles.
19. Id. at 160.
20. Id.
21. This scenario, during the Prohibition Era, strongly resembles the modem "war on
drugs." See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (officers patrolling a high drug area
pursued a fleeing person and arrested him after a pat-down revealed a weapon); see also
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996) (police officers patrolling a high drug area
stopped defendants for traffic violations and subsequently arrested them for narcotics
possession); Gillespie, supra note 3, at 3.
22. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132.
23. Id. at 146; see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
24. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 161.
27. Id. at 160.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
20021
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B. Expanding the Automobile Exception: Inherent Mobility
As in Carroll, the defendant in Chambers v. Maroney,3' contested the
admissibility of evidence seized from a vehicle, arguing that it was the fruit
of an unlawful warrantless search." In Chambers, officers stopped a
vehicle near the scene of an armed robbery because the car and the men
inside matched the description given by two individuals near the scene of
a crime.3 The officers arrested the men and then drove the car to the
police station.' Later, the police searched the car at the station without a
warrant and found two revolvers and other incriminating evidence."
The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that exigent circumstances permitting
a warrantless search still existed because the vehicle remained mobile."
This case differed from Carroll in that the police searched the vehicle
without a warrant while it was under police control." Because there was
probable cause to arrest the men, the Court held that there was also probable
cause to search the car without a warrant for guns and stolen money.' The
fact that the vehicle was under police control and at the police station
eliminated the possibility of destruction of the evidence; however, the Court
apparently decided that because the vehicle had wheels, it remained
mobile. 9 By expanding the concept from actual mobility to inherent
mobility, Chambers further lessened the privacy expectation in relation to
vehicles."
Pennsylvania v. Labron' involved a similar issue and upheld the
warrantless search of parked cars in two consolidated cases. In the first case,
police officers observed the defendant putting drugs into the trunk of a
car.42 The officers then arrested the defendant and searched his car without
a warrant. 3 In the second case, police officers also had probable cause to
search for drugs and did so without a warrant.' Labron reaffirmed the
31. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
32. Id. at 46.
33. Id. at 44.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 51.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. O'Connor, supra note 3, at 400.
41. 518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per curiarn).
42. ld. at 939.
43. Id.
44. Id
676 [Vol. 55:671
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Court's holding in Chambers. The Court literally tossed the exigency
requirement for a warrantless search of an automobile out the window."5
C. The Expectation of Privacy in Vehicles Is Associated with a Property
or Possessory Interest
Rakas v. Illinois' is another automobile case; however, its holding
suggests that it may not be limited to vehicles. ' In Rakas, as in Chambers,
officers stopped a vehicle that matched the description of the getaway car
in a recent armed robbery." The officers ordered the occupants out of the
vehicle, and two of the officers searched the car."9 The occupants were not
arrested at the time, but the police subsequently arrested the occupants upon
discovery of a box of rifle shells and a sawed-off rifle under the seat.' '
Claiming that the search violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, the defendants moved to suppress the seized evidence."
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the search did not violate the
defendants' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because the
defendants lacked standing to contest the legality of the search.52 The
defendants did not own the automobile, the rifle, or shells. 3 They had been
merely passengers; the owner was the driver of the vehicle. The Court
reasoned that the passengers had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the
.vehicle, or the evidence obtained therein, because they had no property or
possessory interest in the vehicle, the rifle, or the shells.- With this
holding, the Court ensured that defendants would not more widely invoke
the exclusionary rule" in future cases." As the dissent in Rakas argued,
the decision "invites police to engage in patently unreasonable searches
every time an automobile contains more than one occupant. Should
something be found, only the owner of the vehicle, or of the item, will have
45. O'Connor, supra note 3, at 426.
46. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
47. O'Connor, supra note 3, at 432 ("The automobile exception cases suggest that the
Court may have turned against the warrant requirement in many areas outside of a home.").
48. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 150.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 148.
55. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (excluding letters seized from
defendant's house without a warrant).
56. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142.
2002]
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standing to seek suppression."" The Court's holding in Rakas establishes
that automobile passengers, having no property or possessory interest in the
vehicle or its contents, lack any legal expectation of privacy.
D. Abandoning Reasonableness: Probable Cause Is the Only Requirement
for Arrest in the Absence of Extraordinary Intrusiveness
The Atwater majority relied heavily on Whren v. United States"8 in
justifying its holding. Whren addressed a probable-cause traffic stop by
plain-clothes vice-squad officers in a "high drug area." 9 In Whren, the
Court found a warrantless traffic stop to be lawful because the operator of
the vehicle stopped at a stop sign for an unreasonably long time, failed to
signal, and was speeding.' The Court reached this conclusion despite the
fact that District of Columbia vice-squad officers in unmarked cars did not
normally conduct traffic stops.6 Officers arrested the defendants when an
officer saw bags of crack cocaine in one of the defendant's hands." Subse-
quently, the officers recovered other illegal drugs in a search of the
defendants' car. The defendants moved to suppress the seized evidence on
the basis that the police lacked probable cause for the stop and that the
officers' grounds for approaching the vehicle to issue a traffic citation were
pretextua. 63
The Court held that as long as officers have probable cause to stop the
vehicle for the traffic violations, the officer's subjective intent is im-
material." Moreover, the Court rejected the "reasonable officer" test urged
by the defendants.' Because this particular case did not involve a search
or seizure conducted in an extraordinary manner, the Court also declined to
engage in a balancing analysis to determine the reasonableness of the initial
57. Id. at 168 (White, J., dissenting).
58. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
59. Id. at 808.
60. ld
61. Id. at 819.
62. Id. at 809.
63. Id. "A pretextual stop is one in which police officers stop a motorist for
constitutionally invalid reasons, but behave in an 'objectively reasonable' manner that
prosecutors can later square with Fourth Amendment requirements." Visser, supra note 3,
at 1685; see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996) (holding that an officer's
subjective intentions are immaterial in a continued detention as long as the officer's actions
are objectively justified); Visser, supra note 3, at 1710 (explaining that Whren facilitates
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of traffic violations based on impermissible factors,
in particular, skin color).
64. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
65. Id. at 815. Such a test would look to whether the particular officer's conduct was
such that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have engaged in the conduct.
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stop.' In holding that probable cause is all that is required for an arrest in
the absence of extraordinary intrusiveness, the Whren Court laid the logical
foundation for the Atwater decision."7
ill. Statement of the Case: Atwater v. City of Lago Vista
A. Facts
In Atwater, a Texas police officer arrested a woman for failing to wear a
seatbelt and failing to ensure that her two children were wearing seatbelts."
The maximum fine for such an offense was fifty dollars," although a Texas
statute authorized an arrest for this particular misdemeanor." Normally,
however, an officer would only issue a citation to the person and not arrest
her for failing to wear a seatbelt."' When the police officer stopped her,
Mrs. Atwater was driving in the small, residential neighborhood of Lago
Vista, a suburb of Austin, at approximately fifteen miles per hour while her
children looked along the ground for a lost toy.'
The officer who stopped Mrs. Atwater was, by all accounts, exceptionally
rude." He had encountered Mrs. Atwater a few months prior and had
stopped her then because her son was riding on the armrest of the vehicle. 4
The son was wearing a seatbelt, however, so the officer merely gave Mrs.
Atwater a warning at that time." On this encounter, the officer scared Mrs.
Atwater's young children so badly with his comments, harsh tone, and
treatment of their mother that the youngest required counseling afterwards.6
66. Id. at 818.
67. Id. at 819.
68. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc,
195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999), affd, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
69. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.413(d) (Vernon 1999).
70. Id. § 543.001.
71. See Atwater, 165 F.3d at 385.
72. Brief of Petitioners at 2, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (No.
99-1408), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.comsupremescourt/briefs/99-1408/
991408mol/brief.pdf. When the officer stopped Mrs. Atwater, he also cited her for not
carrying a driver's license and possessing no proof of insurance. Mrs. Atwater explained to
the officer that she could not produce these documents because her purse had been stolen,
but the officer replied that he had heard that excuse many times before. Id. Those two
charges were later dismissed. Atwater, 165 F.3d at 383.
73. Atwater, 165 F.3d at 382.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 383.
2002]
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Luckily, before the officer hauled Mrs. Atwater and her children to jail,
a neighbor observed what was taking place and took the children." The
officer then handcuffed Mrs. Atwater, put her in the squad car, and drove
her to the police station.' At the station, police forced Mrs. Atwater to
remove her shoes, jewelry, glasses, and everything in her pockets.' After
taking her mug shot, officers placed her in a holding cell for approximately
one hour before a magistrate released her on bond.' Ultimately, she paid
a fifty-dollar fine, the maximum penalty for her seat-belt violation.'
B. Procedural History
Mrs. Atwater sued the city of Lago Vista, the Police Chief, and the officer
who arrested her in state court.' She alleged that the police violated her
Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unreasonable seizure and by
using excessive force and punishment. 3 She also claimed due process
violations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Mrs. Atwater also
submitted state law claims for false imprisonment and intentional infliction
of emotional distress." The city removed the case to the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas, where the judge granted
summary judgment for the defendants."
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed the summary judgment,'7 holding that although
the Texas statute authorized arrest, it did so only when an arrest would be
reasonable under the circumstances." Subsequently, the court, sitting en
banc, granted a rehearing 9 and ruled in favor of the city.' The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether the Fourth
Amendment, as extended to the states through the due process clause of the
77. Id. at 382.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 382-
81. Brief of Pe
82. Atwater, 1
83. Id.
84. Id.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
(2001).
83.
titioners at 5, Atwater (No. 99-1408).
65 F.3d at 383.
Id.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 325 (2001).
Atwater, 165 F.3d at 389.
Id. at 386.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 171 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999).
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999), affd, 532 U.S. 318
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Fourteenth Amendment, forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal
offense.'
C. Holding/Majority Reasoning
The U.S. Supreme Court's five-to-four majority opinion in Atwater held
that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor
traffic violation.' The Court stated that as long as the officer has probable
cause to believe that an individual has committed even a minor criminal
offense, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied, and the officer may arrest the
individual. 3 Justice Souter, writing for the majority, cited United States v.
Watson," Carroll v. United States," and Bad Elk v. United States,"
among others, to support the proposition that at common law a police officer
could make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed in his
presence.' Although the Court reasoned that the common law at the time
of the framing of the Constitution, as well as English and American statutes,
authorized peace officers to make warrantless arrests without a breach of the
peace for many different minor offenses," the Court also recognized
contrary authority." Ultimately, the Court noted that "statements about the
common law of warrantless misdemeanor arrest simply are not uniform.."...
The Court then referred to various state statutes,"" such as the one in
Texas, that permit warrantless misdemeanor arrests without requiring a
breach of the peace." The Court declined to tailor a rule to address the
facts of the instant case and rejected Mrs. Atwater's formulation of a new
test because of the confusion the Court anticipated it would cause police
officers."'' The Court reasoned that the need for clear and simple standards
91. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001).
92. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 326.
93. Id. at 354.
94. 423 U.S. 411, 420 (1976).
95. 267 U.S. 132, 156-57 (1925).
96. 177 U.S. 529, 534 (1900).
97. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 340-41.
98. William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth
Amendment, 58 Mo. L. REV. 771, 776-77 (1993) (stating that most jurisdictions do not
require a breach of the peace to make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor).
99. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 329. English common law only permitted warrantless arrest
of those committing or threatening to commit a breach of the peace. Schroeder, supra note
98, at 789.
100. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 329.
101. The Court lists statutes representing all fifty states and the District of Columbia in
an appendix to its opinion. Id. at 355-60.
102. Id. at 359.
103. Id. at 345-54. But see Bradley, supra note 12, at 1475 (stating that the Court "has
20021
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and the need for an officer to act on a moment's notice both justify the
probable-cause-only standard."'
Mrs. Atwater suggested that the Court should balance the needs of society
and the privacy interests of individuals to determine the reasonableness of
an arrest for a minor offense.'" Although the Court conceded that a rule
based on the facts of this case would likely result in Mrs. Atwater's favor,
the Court declined to adopt a balancing approach and opted instead for a
bright-line rule: misdemeanor arrests that are based upon probable cause do
not violate the Fourth Amendment."* The Court also declined Mrs.
Atwater's argument in favor of distinguishing between offenses that could
result in jail time and those that could only result in a fine."'" The Court
reasoned that an officer might not be able to differentiate between jailable
and nonjailable offenses when deciding whether to arrest an individual, nor
should he be required to do so."
Mrs. Atwater also sought to refine the limitation between jailable and
nonjailable offenses by allowing warrantless arrests only when "necessary
for enforcement of the traffic laws or when an offense would otherwise
continue and pose a danger to others on the road.""'' The Court dismissed
this idea because of the difficulty of administration, the prospect of
evidentiary exclusion, and concern for officers' civil liability for misap-
plication of the standard."" The Court mentioned that there was no reason
to believe that arrests for minor offenses posed a widespread problem."'
The Court, citing Whren, proclaimed that when there is no extraordinary
sown massive confusion among the police and lower courts" through the use of multiple
exceptions to the warrant requirement). Professor Bradley suggests that focusing on the
reasonableness under the circumstances would cure this confusion. Id. at 1481.
104. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347. The Court also cited New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
458 (1981), as standing for the proposition that courts should express Fourth Amendment
rules "'in terms that are readily applicable by the police'" and not "'qualified by all sorts of
ifs, ands, and buts.' Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347. The Court later cited Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420, 431 n.13 (1984), noting that officers 'have neither the time nor the
competence to determine' the severity of the offense for which they are considering arresting
a person." Atwater, 532 U.S. at 348.
105. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 345-46.
106. Id. at 354; see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985) (asserting the
"traditional rule that arrests may be made only on probable cause"); Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (asserting that probable cause, without a balancing test, is the
minimum necessary for an arrest with a few exceptions).
107. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 348.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 349.
110. Id.
I I1. Id. at 351-52.
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intrusiveness involved in the search and when probable cause to arrest
exists, there is no need to balance the interests of the individual against
those of the government."' Whereas in Whren the officers did not arrest
the defendant until they saw contraband, the Court apparently viewed this
distinction as immaterial. The glaring difference between Whren and
Atwater is that in Whren the officers arrested the individual after he had
committed a felony, and in Atwater, the officer arrested Mrs. Atwater for a
mere traffic violation. Thus, Atwater continues down the road established
in Carroll of steadily contracting Fourth Amendment protections of
individuals, resulting in almost no expectation of privacy in relation to
automobiles.
D. The Dissent
Justice O'Connor's dissent is important because it addresses the public's
concerns about being arrested for a minor offense. Indeed, an arrest for a
traffic violation affronts the sensibilities of the average citizen. Justice
O'Connor's dissent began by asserting that it is unreasonable to arrest
someone when the maximum punishment is a small fine."3 She also stated
that, in this case, history provides no consistent basis for ruling on the
issue."" She asserted that probable cause alone is insufficient and that a
Fourth Amendment balancing test is necessary."5 O'Connor stated that, in
the act of balancing, one must look at the penalty for the offense to
determine the government interest."' She quoted Terry v. Ohio"' in
formulating a recommendation that an officer should issue a citaiion in cases
of fine-only offenses unless "'specific and articulable facts . . . taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the
additional] intrusion' of a full custodial arrest..."
Justice O'Connor also referred to the significant liberty and privacy
intrusions that an arrest entails. "' Stating that the standard of probable
112. Id. at 352-53.
113. Id. at 360 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260,
266-67 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that "a persuasive claim might have been
made in this case that the custodial arrest of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated
his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments"); Schroeder, supra note 98, at 800
(proclaiming that when a person is arrested for a misdemeanor, the arrest is likely the most
severe consequence).
114. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 365 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
117. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
118. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original).
119. Id. at 363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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cause itself is not one of precision, she downplayed the majority's reasons
for and insistence on a bright-line rule focused on probable cause."'2 Many
ordinary citizens might agree with Justice O'Connor, in that the advantage
of the clarity of a bright-line rule does not justify infringing citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights.
Addressing the concerns that officers would be subject to civil liability for
unconstitutional arrests and thus face a strong disincentive to make even a
valid arrest, Justice O'Connor reminded the Court that qualified immunity
is an adequate solution to both issues.' Warning of the potential for abuse
by police officers having unfettered discretion to arrest for fine-only
offenses, Justice O'Connor concluded that because an officer's subjective
motivations for making traffic stops are beyond the Court's purview, the
Court has the duty to ensure that officers' actions upon a traffic stop are
within the constitutional bounds of the Fourth Amendment.2
IV. Analysis and Implications
A. The Failure of the Reasonableness Argument
1. Disagreement in the Precedent
Although the majority ultimately concluded that it was unnecessary to
determine the reasonableness of the arrest, it conceded that the argument
does have merit. The majority admitted that, purely based on the facts of the
case, Atwater's arguments were plausible. But, as has been the case in the
past, the majority erred on the side of the bright-line rule in favor of law
enforcement. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has used a reasonableness
test in many instances where society's expectations of privacy are less or the
search and seizure is extraordinarily intrusive, the Court declined to adopt
the reasonableness test in Atwater. The majority's ruling establishes the need
for states to adopt legislation to protect their citizens' Fourth Amendment
interests.
Both the majority and the dissent noted that the common law at the time
of the framing of the Constitution provided no clear guidance as to whether
minor offenses required a breach of the peace for an officer to arrest an
120. Id. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 367 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Barbara C. Salken, The General
Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion
to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221, 230 (1989) (warning that a
discretionary power to arrest creates a great danger of officers using arrest as a pretext to
conduct a search).
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individual.'" The majority also cited eighteenth century and modem
statutes that did not require a breach of the peace before permitting an
arrest."' Indeed, both sides cited a multitude of cases, statutes, commen-
taries, and treatises to support their respective positions, ultimately tending
to prove only great disparity of opinion in the area.'" Because precedent
does not clearly support one position over the other, the dissent asserted that
a balancing test would appropriately "'evaluate the search or seizure under
traditional standards of reasonableness"' by balancing the respective interests
involved. 2'
The Supreme Court initially adopted the traditional exceptions to the
warrant requirement because exigent circumstances existed in which it was
impractical for an officer to obtain a warrant.' Additionally, the cases that
allow a warrantless search or seizure are those in which an impartial
magistrate would issue a warrant based on probable cause.'2" Terry
illustrates that the "central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment [is] the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental
invasion of a citizen's personal security."'29  To determine the
reasonableness of the intrusion, the Court must balance "the need to search
[or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails." ''
123. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 328; id. at 363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
124. The majority cited early English statutes authorizing peace officers to arrest people
playing unlawful games, to arrest beggars and other idle and disorderly persons, and to arrest
negligent carriage drivers. Id. at 333. Preconstitutional American statutes allowed arrest for
drunkenness, profane swearing, Sabbath-breaking, and fortune-telling. Id. at 337. See also
the appendix to the opinion of the Court. Id. at 355-60.
125. In her brief, Atwater referred to the fact that the rejection of the use of general
warrants and writs of assistance led to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment. Brief of
Petitioners at 8-12, Atwater (No. 99-1408).
126. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)); see also Salken, supra note 122, at 263 (stating that
a seizure can be unreasonable, notwithstanding probable cause, if "it is too intrusive or
unjustified by the circumstances," and a court must balance the individual's interests against
the government's interests to determine the reasonableness of a course of action).
127. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) ("[I]n most instances failure to comply with
the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent circumstances.").
128. Id. at 21.
129. Id. at 19; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) ("The
exception to the probable-cause requirement for limited seizures ... in Terry and its progeny
rests on a balancing of the competing interests to determine the reasonableness of the type of
seizure ....").
130. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (alterations in original) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)).
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The majority opinion admitted that balancing the interests of the arresting
officer against Mrs. Atwater did not overcome the significant invasion of her
Fourth Amendment rights. 3 ' Moreover, the Court stated that if it were to
develop a rule directly applicable to the facts in the instant case, Atwater
would have prevailed. 2 In Atwater, a magistrate would not likely have
issued an arrest warrant for an individual who was not a flight risk, posed no
serious threat to others, and had only committed a minor misdemeanor.'33
2. The Two-Part Test Defined
The dissent asserted that a two-part test, defined by Terry, would
appropriately evaluate an arrest for a fine-only offense, as in Atwater."
Although the officers belief that Atwater had violated the law justified the
initial stop, the crime was a minor one for which it was arguably un-
reasonable to arrest Atwater. The officer had to make two separate
decisions. First, the officer had to decide whether to stop Atwater. Probable
cause to stop Mrs. Atwater existed. Next, the officer had to decide
whether to issue a citation or to arrest. The dissent would require the police
officer to be "'able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the
additional] intrusion.""'  The officer in Atwater had no specific and
articulable facts that justified arresting Atwater instead of issuing her a
citation.
Tennessee v. Garner illustrates a much more drastic example of the two-
part test.'" In Garner, the Court held that a state statute authorizing deadly
force to effectuate an arrest was unconstitutional in the case of an escaping,
unarmed felon. 3 Garner is another example of the need to distinguish the
justification for the seizure from the justification for the type of seizure that
131. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347; see also Schroeder, supra note 98, at 804 (stating that
when the legislature classifies an offense as a misdemeanor, it shows that the interest in
arrest for this offense is minor).
132. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347.
133. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 244 (5th Cir. 1999), aff'd, 532 U.S.
318 (2001).
134. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20 ("And in determining whether the seizure and search were
'unreasonable' our inquiry is a dual one, whether the officer's action was justified at its
inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place.").
135. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
136. Id. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21) (alteration in
original).
137. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
138. Id. at 3.
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ultimately results. Although probable cause existed to seize the suspect, the
Court stated that the next part of the analysis must determine the
reasonableness of the manner in which the police conducted the seizure.'39
The Supreme Court applied this same analysis in Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, MI holding that drawing one's blood without consent at a hospital is
permissible."' In Schmerber, probable cause existed for a warrantless
search because the individual was clearly drunk and exigent circumstances
existed because the evidence would dissipate over a matter of hours. The
Court, however, went on to determine that the Fourth Amendment intrusion
was reasonable."" Conversely, in Winston v. Lee,'"3 probable cause alone
did not justify a search.'" The Court deemed that a surgical procedure to
remove a bullet to prove the defendant had attempted armed robbery was
extraordinarily intrusive."
In Atwater, the police lawfully seized Mrs. Atwater for her violation of
the seatbelt laws. However, the seizure was unreasonable when the
government's interests are balanced against Mrs. Atwater's interests. The
existence of probable cause justified the initial stop, but the officer needed
to take the next step and reasonably determine whether he should issue a
citation or make an arrest. The dissent argues that with a small-fine offense,
other exigent circumstances must exist to justify an intrusive arrest." If
"specific and articulable facts"'4 7 supporting an arrest do not exist, then the
officer must only issue a citation.
3. Balancing the Interests: Are These Rights Worth Protecting?
Importantly, society must protect individuals from arrest for minor
offenses in those areas it deems reasonable and worthy of protection. In
139. Id. at 7-8. "Because one of the factors is the extent of the intrusion, it is plain that
reasonableness depends on ... how it is carried out." Id. at 8. The constitutionality of the
seizure is determined by balancing an individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
government's interests. Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). The
Court also cited a number of cases standing for the proposition that courts must employ a
totality-of-the circumstances approach in each case of search or seizure. Id. at 8-9; see also
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1989) (holding that courts must evaluate the
reasonableness of the seizure in each case, using the severity of the crime as one factor to
determine if police used excessive force during the seizure).
140. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
141. Id. at 777.
142. Id.
143. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
144. Id. at 760.
145. Id.
146. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 365 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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many cases, the Court has based decisions, at least in part, on whether
society deems certain governmental intrusions valid in areas in which
society expects privacy. For example, in California v. Greenwood,'" the
Court held that a person does not expect privacy in garbage set out on the
curb because society is not interested in protecting the privacy of gar-
bage.' 9 Again, in Oliver v. United States,'"' the Court stated that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect subjective expectations of privacy, but
only those that society wants to protect. 5 ' In another case, the Court noted
that a juvenile's right to privacy at school is not as highly protected as that
of an adult, holding that a search of a girl's purse under reasonable suspicion
of finding cigarettes was constitutional.' 3 Theoretically, courts must
evaluate the reasonableness of searches and seizures "'in light of contem-
porary norms and conditions.""" However, in most of the cases in which
the Court has addressed an individual's expectation of privacy, the Court has
decided that there is no societal expectation of privacy.
Along with the former approach, the Court has almost always employed
a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of searches and seizures
when society deems that less privacy is expected. The Court has consis-
tently held that an automobile is one place where individuals expect less
privacy.' Other such places are schools, airports, open fields, prisons, and
the borders of a country.'55 In each of these instances, the Court has
engaged in a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of either a
search or seizure.' In Atwater, Mrs. Atwater was in her automobile.
148. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
149. Id.
150. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
151. Id.
152. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
153. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217 n.10 (1981) (quoting Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980)).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977) (discussing the fact
that riding in a vehicle necessarily lowers privacy expectations because a car is not normally
used as a residence, it does not serve as a repository for personal items, people travel in
vehicles in plain view of others, and vehicles are highly regulated by the government).
155. See T.LO., 469 U.S. at 350 (upholding a warrantless search by a school's principal
when he had a reasonable suspicion of finding contraband in a juvenile's purse); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 538 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that "all searches and
seizures of the contents of an inmate's cell are reasonable"); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 184 (defining
the "open fields" doctrine); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975)
(holding that privacy expectations at the border of the country are significantly less); United
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1101 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding that overriding security
concerns limit privacy expectations in airports).
156. See supra note 155.
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Therefore, one may argue that the Court should have employed the
traditional reasonableness test. The Court should have balanced Mrs.
Atwater's rights to privacy against law enforcement's need to arrest her for
a minor offense and subsequently search her and her vehicle.
4. Is the Arrest Extraordinarily Intrusive?
Mrs. Atwater argued that an arrest for a minor traffic violation is
extraordinarily intrusive'57 because police do not arrest most people for an
offense for which the penalty is less severe than the arrest itself.s '
Additionally, a public arrest is embarrassing, and the effects may linger in
that even if one is acquitted of a minor offense, the record of the arrest will
most likely be available to the public.'5
Beyond the physical restraint and embarrassment involved in being
handcuffed and taken to jail, an arrestee must also face the dangers of the
holding cell where he could be exposed to dangerous felons.' Someone
arrested for a seatbelt violation on a Saturday or Sunday may have to spend
the weekend in jail waiting to see a magistrate the following Monday.'"
In response to this argument, the majority stated that such cases of abuse
had not flooded courts showing this to be a widespread problem.'62 They
alluded to the fact that the instant case represented an isolated incident in
which the police officer's judgment was extremely poor, although his actions
were constitutional.'63 The Court, however, overlooks the fact that
litigation is costly. Mrs. Atwater's husband happened to be an emergency
room physician, so they arguably had more money than most families and
could afford to sue. The Court's lack of awareness of the problem does not
equate to the nonexistence of the problem. Most people in Mrs. Atwater's
situation would be upset about their treatment, but would not seek a remedy
in court.
Although the Court did not address it, persons arrested while in the
company of children could experience additional problems. We are left to
wonder what would have happened to Mrs. Atwater's small children had a
neighbor not rescued them from riding along to the police station with their
157. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001).
158. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that an
argument can be made that the restrictions on arrest should be greater than those on searches
because an arrest "is a serious personal intrusion").
159. Schroeder, supra note 98, at 797.
160. Id. ("Any arrest has a profound and long-lasting effect on the arrestee.").
161. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991).
162. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353.
163. See id. at 355.
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mother. One can only assume that the officers, upon receiving the children,
would have called the Department of Health and Human Services or an
equivalent organization to take the children into temporary custody. The
arrestee would experience additional problems if he were not a resident of
the community or state where arrested. If it were difficult for friends or
family of such an individual immediately to pick up the children, they
would, in effect, be incarcerated along with their parent, although not
actually held in a jail cell.
5. The Bright-Line Rule Prevails
Because the Supreme Court has declined to engage in a balancing test, the
bright-line rule that it is constitutional for officers to arrest individuals for
minor infractions is the law. In order to prevent their citizens from being
arrested for seatbelt violations, states must now rely on their legislatures to
remedy the situation. The majority noted that "[iut is of course easier to
devise a minor-offense limitation by statute than to derive one through the
Constitution, simply because the statute can let the arrest power turn on any
sort of practical consideration without having to subsume it under a broader
principle."'" This note submits three different approaches.
B. Suggested Solutions to the Administrability Problem
1. The Malum in Se/Malum Prohibitum Distinction
The first possible solution would be for courts to distinguish between
mala in se and mala prohibita traffic offenses. Mala in se offenses are
offenses that involve an element of moral culpability or that were crimes
under common law. 5 They are "true crimes." These offenses consist of
two parts: a mental element, the mens rea; and an act, the actus reas."
One example is the crime of burglary. Burglary involves the acts of
breaking and entering, but the acts alone are not enough. To be guilty of the
crime of burglary, the accused must also have the requisite mental intent to
commit a crime in the dwelling.' 7
Mala prohibita offenses are offenses that violate laws created merely to
regulate life in society.' Mala prohibita offenses do not include moral
turpitude or any mental element." These offenses are merely wrong
164. Id. at 352.
165. See supra note 14.
166. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.10 (3d ed. 1982).
167. Robert E.L. Richardson, The Proposed Decriminalization of Civil Offenses in
Oklahoma 8 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
168. See supra note 14.
169. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 166, § 7.5; see also Richardson, supra note 167,
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because the law prohibits them. For instance, traveling one mile over the
speed limit is a malum prohibitum offense because it does not matter that
you did not know that you were violating the law or that your speedometer
was not functioning properly. Mala prohibita offenses, such as speeding and
not wearing a seatbelt, should only require a citation, while mala in se
offenses, such as reckless driving and driving under the influence (DUI),
would result in a custodial arrest."'
Arguments against using this classification system do exist. For example,
although dividing crimes on this basis would be an easy task for a lawyer,
it might not be as clear-cut for a police officer. Officers could receive
training in this area; however, policy makers could argue that the time and
money involved is unjustified. Therefore, a second solution would be to rely
on legislative bodies to pass laws listing which crimes could lead to an
arrest. In such a situation, officers would not have to interpret legal terms
or balance the reasonableness of a course of action. Merely by learning
which offenses the law classifies as true crimes versus administrative or civil
offenses, the officers would know the crimes for which they could arrest.
2. Recodification of State Statutes
A good illustration of what states can do to protect their citizens from
arrest for minor offenses exists in the product of the Oklahoma Legislative
Recodification Committee from 1990 to 1992."' Using the Model Penal
Code as a guide, the Committee first determined that Oklahoma should
codify all crimes in title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes." The Committee
located and analyzed every crime in the Oklahoma Statutes and created four
different classifications for offenses: (1) felonies, (2) misdemeanors, (3) civil
infractions, and (4) administrative violations.'" The proposal then placed
all crimes and misdemeanors into title 21.74 The proposals kept all civil
infractions and administrative violations in their respective titles but did not
at II.
170. For examples of the use of this classification, see District of Columbia v. Colts, 282
U.S. 63 (1930), where the Court held that driving recklessly is a malum in se offense, and
United States v. Ramos, 815 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Ariz. 1993), where Arizona did not allow
arrest for most traffic violations because they are mala prohibitum offenses, while the state
did allow arrest for negligent homicide, driving under the influence, and failure to stop at an
accident.
171. Robert E.L. Richardson, Analysis and Proposed Disposition of Crimes in Titles I
Through 20 and 22 Through 85 of the Oklahoma Statutes i (Feb. 16, 1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
172. Id. at ii.
173. Id.
174. Id. at ii-iii.
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consider them crimes and did not allow for arrest." The Committee
defined administrative violations as violations of an "administrative rule,
policy or procedure [that] needs an enforcement provision and a sufficient
administrative structure exists to process it effectively."'7 It defined civil
infractions as infractions of some "rule, policy or procedure" or a harm that
"is civil in nature, needs an enforcement provision and cannot adequately be
processed in all areas of the state by aii administrative agency."'" Thus,
the Committee lumped both civil infractions and administrative violations
into the category of civil offenses, punishable only by fine.
The next part of the Recodification Committee's analysis determined
which offenses Oklahoma law should classify as criminal or civil in
nature.' 8 The proposed guidelines were quite similar to the mala prohibita
and mala in se classifications. If the rule, policy, or provision existed for the
general welfare of society or affected the public at large, the proposal would
classify it as a civil offense.'" All civil offenses fell within the category
of mala prohibita offenses. If the offense was a crime at the common law,
indicated a dangerous personality, or was "sufficiently reprehensible within
itself," the proposal classified it as a crime." ' Thus, all crimes in title 21
were mala in se offenses. The Committee also decriminalized or repealed
some "crimes," such as adultery, because they were unknown or rarely
charged.'' Also, the proposal moved offenses with a separate mental
element that were not determined to belong in title 21 to other titles, and the
proposal deleted the separate mental elements.'82
Although the work of the Oklahoma Recodification Committee took
almost three years, the benefits of such work would greatly benefit every
state. The proposal itself consisted of 254 pages, very few pages when
compared to the entire length of all of the Oklahoma Statutes. Furthermore,
the advantages of reviewing state statutes are numerous. Such review
performs regular house-keeping functions by eliminating unnecessary
statutes or parts of those statutes. Not only is legislation clearer to those
whose job it is to carry out the law, but the legislation is more easily
understood by the average citizen. Every citizen of every state should be
175. Id. at iii.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at iii-iv.
180. Id. at iv.
181. Id. at i.
182. Id. at iv.
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able to determine easily what offenses state law characterizes as criminal
and the penalties attached to those crimes.
The system proposed by the Oklahoma Recodification Committee makes
finding the information much easier. By simply looking at one title of the
state statutes, the citizens of a state, including police officers, could
determine every crime and know when an arrest is applicable in that state.
Such a system would greatly benefit police officers and also those citizens
who have no real remedy in a case such as Atwater. Additionally, restricting
the offenses for which officers can arrest enhances the productivity of the
police force. Because officers spend much valuable time taking arrestees to
the station for booking, limiting arrests in the case of very minor offenses
enhances productivity. Citizens would know that they will still face
punishment for violations of minor offenses, but the average law-abiding
citizen need not fear that police will arrest and confine him to a holding cell
with all of the humiliation that entails. Recodifying state statutes would save
police departments and citizens unnecessary embarrassment and would also
conserve state money in the long run.'
The Lago Vista Police Department incurred much negative publicity
because of the mistakes of one officer. '" Although the U.S. Supreme
Court deemed his actions constitutional, it also indicated that they were
unnecessary. Average citizens may now see police officers in a different
light. They might perceive officers not as protectors of the peace and the
public, but as individuals to avoid. Thus, citizens may now be more loathe
to stop when they see lights flashing in their rear view mirror than prior to
Atwater.
Additionally, if state statutes no longer classified many minor offenses as
criminal, a violator would not have a right to an attorney, a right that costs
the state significant amounts of money in the case of indigent defen-
dants.'" The fact that the defendant would not have the right to an
attorney would not cause major concern because the violation would not be
a "crime" and not allow for any jail time.'
183. Richardson, supra note 167, at 15.
184. David S. Olsen, Handcuffing the Fourth: Supreme Court Ruling Carries with It
"Grave Potential"for Police Abuse, L.A. DAILY J., May 2, 2001, available at http:llwww.
agapay.com/handcuff.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003); US Supreme Court Upholds Police
Terrorizing Seat-Belt Violators, THE VALUES OF EROWID, at http://www. erowid.org/freedoml
police/police-supreme.casei.shtml (last modified Apr. 25, 2001).
185. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355.8 (2001); State v. Independence County, 850 S.W.2d 842,
846-47 (Ark. 1993); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 826-28 (Kan. 1987).
186. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355.6 (2001); Smith, 747 P.2d at 825.
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Mrs. Atwater and her family spent much time and money on a case that
they ultimately lost because the Supreme Court did not want to create a
broad rule that would further complicate the area of search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. In responding, states should reexamine and
revise their statutes as the optimum solution to the problem. Such revision
should clearly delineate the offenses for which officers may arrest and
should protect societal expectations of privacy without the need to engage
in an additional reasonableness test. The efforts of the Oklahoma
Recodification Committee provide a roadmap for any such effort.
3. Modified Recodification
A third solution exists if a state determines that revision of the state
statutes would entail too much time and/or money. A state could simply
revise those statutes dealing with the few offenses that should not result in
an arrest. This third approach would not take as much time or effort as
recodifying all of the state's statutes; however, legislators would run the risk
of leaving some statutes out of the revision process. Legislators could
simply determine that certain minor offenses, like violation of the seatbelt
laws, littering, over-parking, or speeding, should only result in a fine and not
arrest. The states' legislative bodies should incorporate such language in
statutes or ordinances. In fact, many states have approached the issue in this
manner already.""
V. Impact: The Practical Effect
Atwater carries potentially serious implications, because once a lawful
arrest occurs, an officer may conduct a search incident to the arrest.'
Atwater could lead officers to arrest more people for very minor violations
so that they could conduct incident searches and not worry about the
admissibility of evidence seized in these lawful searches. Another con-
sideration is that for a minor violation, a potential arrestee usually has the
expectation that the police will stop him temporarily and not arrest him.
Even an officer probably does not know initially if he will merely tem-
porarily stop or arrest an individual. Giving the officer the discretion to
187. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 352 (2001) (citing ALA. CODE
§ 32-1-4 (1999); CAL. VEH. CODE § 40504 (West 2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.015(1)-
(2) (Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:391 (West 1989); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP.
§ 26-202(a)(2) (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-33-2 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-7-118(b)(1) (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-936 (Michie 2000)).
188. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Salken, supra note 122, at 224
("Restricting the power to arrest is the most rational and effective solution to preventing
unjustified searches incident to arrest for traffic offenses ....").
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decide which course of action to take may result in many more pretextual
stops and arrests. 9 If the individual belongs to a certain race or falls
within a certain age group, the officer may decide to arrest the individual so
that he can then search the driver and the passenger compartment of the
vehicle for contraband or other evidence of wrongdoing.' ' In addition to
the potential search questions this dilemma raises, Atwater could lead police
to arrest people for all types of minor offenses, including those not related
to automobiles.
In Oklahoma, officers can currently arrest individuals for a misdemeanor
traffic violation,' 9 ' although title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes, dealing with
motor vehicles, provides for a fine not to exceed twenty dollars for violation
of the seatbelt law.' As stated in the penalties section, title 47 considers
violation of any of its provisions a misdemeanor unless otherwise classified
as a felony.' Courts may fine persons convicted of misdemeanors in title
47 up to $500 and may imprison violators for no more than ten days if the
statute does not provide another penalty.'" After the Atwater case,
Oklahoma Senator Frank Shurden (D-District 8) introduced Senate Bill 444,
amending title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes to ensure that police could not
handcuff or incarcerate seatbelt violators.' Governor Frank Keating
vetoed the bill on June 5th, 2001, for other reasons.'
189. Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search
Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 381, 382 (2001) (citing Professor Wayne
LaFave in stating that a search incident to arrest is the most common justification for
conducting a warrantless search).
190. Salken, supra note 122, at 234 (stating that "[a]s a result of Robinson, Gustafson,
and Belton, police officers now have unconditional power to make far-reaching searches of
anyone arrested for a traffic offense"). See generally Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I.
Edelstein, Pretext Stops and Racial Profiling After Whren v. United States: The New York
and New Jersey Responses Compared, 63 ALB. L. REV. 725 (2000); Ira Glasser, Speech:
American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow: The 1999 Edward C. Sobota Lecture, 63 ALB.
L. REV. 703 (2000).
191. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 17-101 (2001); see also id. § 16-114 ("A police officer may,
without a warrant, arrest a person for any moving traffic violation of which the arresting
officer or another police officer in communication with the arresting officer has sensory or
electronic perception including perception by radio, radar and reliable speed-measuring
devices.").
192. Id. § 12-417(E) ("Fine and court costs for violating the provisions of this section
shall not exceed Twenty Dollars ($20.00).").
193. Id. § 17-101(A).
194. Id. § 17-101(B)(l).
195. The bill would provide the following language to amend the current statute, 47
OKLA. STAT. § 11-1112 (2000): "Provided, a law enforcement officer may not handcuff or
incarcerate any person for a violation of this section." Enrolled S.B. 444, 48th Okla. Leg.,
1st Sess., at 6-7 (Okla. 2001), available at LEXIS, 2001 Bill Text OK S.B. 444.
196. Oklahoma Legislature Homepage, Status of Measures, History, 2001 Regular
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VI. Conclusion
Many states have incorporated into their statutes language similar to that
of Senate Bill 444 so that what occurred in Atwater does not happen in their
states. Oklahoma's citizens would be well served if the legislature would
adopt something similar to the work product of the Oklahoma Legislative
Recodification Committee. Recodifying the state statutes so that all crimes
reside in only one title would serve as an easily administrable solution for
law enforcement. Such a solution would also prove a fair arbiter of justice
for citizens by enforcing laws while continuing to respect individuals' rights.
Recodification would ensure that only actual criminal offenses could result
in an arrest. All civil offenses would merely authorize fines.
If this solution proves unfeasible for the State, then the legislature should
pass specific bills, such as Senate Bill 444, that would protect Oklahoma
citizens' Fourth Amendment rights by providing that an officer may not
arrest for a minor offense. The third option involves returning to the
traditional classification system that distinguishes between mala in se and
mala prohibita offenses so that citizens committing mala prohibita offenses
are not branded and treated as criminals.
The Supreme Court's holding in Atwater signifies an all-time low in due
process rights and expectations of privacy for individuals in automobiles.
The case reveals that a judicial solution no longer exists to combat the
problem of unnecessary arrests for minor offenses. States must combat this
problem by passing legislation that prohibits arrests for minor traffic
violations.
Amy J. Nelson
Session, Measure Numbers: SB444, at http://www.lsb.state.ok.us/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
The Governor stated that he vetoed the bill because "this bill does not clearly indicate that
all officers of the highway patrol are to complete the full Patrol Academy of the Department
of Public Safety." Governor Frank Keating, Veto Attachment to S.B. 444 (June 5, 2001).
For a copy of Governor Keating's veto, see Appendix A.
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APPENDIX A
No. SB 444
JUNE 5th, 2001
TIME SIGNED: 9:30 am
OFFICE OF,
THE GOVERNOR
STATE OF OKLAHOMA
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLA.
TO THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE
AND MEMBERS OF THE OKLAHOMA SENATE
FIRST SESSION, FORTY-EIGHTH OKLAHOMA LEGISLATURE
ENROLLED SENATE BILL NO. 444
BY:
SHURDEN of the SENATE
and
LEIST of the HOUSE
This is to advise you that on this date, pursuant to the authority vested in
me by Section I 1 of Article VI of the Oklahoma Constitution to approve or
object to legislation presented to me, I have VETOED Senate Bill 444
because this bill does not clearly indicate that all officers of the highway
patrol are to complete the full Patrol Academy of the Department of Public
Safety, a requirement that must exist in order to protect the safety of the
public.
The bill also requires the Department to provide the same uniform and
equipment to all officers of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol Division.
However, the legislature has failed to provide adequate funding to
implement this mandate.
BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
FRANK KEATING
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